In reality, there are three obstacles that stand in the way. The first is stare decisis-redefining federal privileges or immunities would likely require overturning 138 years of precedent going back to the SlaughterHouse Cases. 15 Second, even Justice Scalia has submitted to the fact that substantive due process now enforces individual rights against the States, therefore making it extremely impractical to switch doctrines of incorporation. 16 Finally, even if the Court considered abandoning substantive due process, it is extremely wary of doing so without a clear consensus on the full scope and meaning of federal privileges or immunities. 17 
II. HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

A. The Fourteenth Amendment
Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government and not to the States. 18 In the 1833 case of Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, "the [Supreme] Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, . . . firmly rejected the proposition that the first eight Amendments operate as limitations on the States, holding that they apply only to the Federal Government." 19 But, after the Civil War, the addition of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments "fundamentally altered our country's federal system." 20 In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, southern states enacted "black codes" designed "to force blacks into a state of subservience and subjugation." 21 The laws restricted the civil rights and liberties of former slaves. 22 In response, Congress enacted "the first 25 However, " [d] ebate still rages over the purpose or 'intent' of these amendments."
26 "But, at a minimum, the framers of the [Thirteenth and Fourteenth A]mendments believed they were expanding the Bill of Rights to the states and giving Congress broad plenary power to protect both civil rights and civil liberties . . . ." 27 
B. Interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
There has been much debate in recent decades over the meaning of "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 28 There are disagreements at virtually every step of the analysis, even among those who consider themselves originalists. 29 First, there is disagreement about "whether the clause was intended simply to require the states to make their laws apply equally to all their citizens or to mandate a certain substantive content to state law." 30 The former interpretation focuses on equality and reads the Clause as a nondiscrimination provision similar to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which prevents States from treating visitors differently than residents. 31 The latter, substantive interpretation reads the Clause as a mandate for a "substantive package of entitlements" to be guaranteed under state law. 
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The substantive view itself has two competing interpretations as to the meaning of the privileges or immunities of federal citizenship. 33 The first interpretation applies the Bill of Rights and every other constitutional guarantee to the States. 34 The second interpretation views the Clause as applying only the Bill of Rights to the States and nothing more.
35
This interpretation takes a Lockean view of privileges or immunities by defining them broadly as natural rights given to all people that cannot be taken away by government. 36 Advocates of these views are generally referred to as "incorporationists" in the context of the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
37
In addition to various disagreements about the meaning of the clause, there is even disagreement about whether it has any meaning at all.
38
Judge Bork, an originalist icon, famously described it as nothing more than an "ink blot. There are a variety of theories on the method to Justice Miller's reasoning. The conventional wisdom has been that he restricted the Privileges or Immunities Clause because the only alternative was to open a Pandora's Box of new legal rights. 71 Others argue that Justice Miller was primarily worried about a major shift in the balance between state and federal rights based on his concern that the Supreme Court would effectively become the "'perpetual censor" of the state legislatures.
72
Originalists point out the irony of such concern, given that the method ultimately chosen to enforce the Bill of Rights against the Statessubstantive due process and its kaleidoscope of rights-is subject to exactly that criticism.
D. Saenz v. Roe
The next time the Court seriously dealt with the Privileges or Immunities Clause came in the 1999 case of Saenz v. Roe. 73 California passed a law limiting welfare benefits for new residents of the state. 74 In order to prevent people from moving to California for larger welfare checks, the statute limited new residents to receiving the same amount of 69. E.g., Newsom, supra note 37, at 649 (stating that "[n]ot once in [Slaughter-House] did the Court seriously suggest . . . that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not incorporate Bill of Rights Freedoms" and that "it suggests that core Bill of Rights freedoms are among the 'privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." (third alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)).
70. 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
71. Newsom, supra note 37, at 666 (citing LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 199 (1975) Finding an unenumerated right to travel in the Constitution, 76 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, struck down the statute as a violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed on citizens' "right to choose to be citizens 'of the State wherein they reside.'" 77 This right to travel had three components: the right to enter one state and leave another; "the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien"; and, for those who want to be permanent residents, the right to be treated equally to native-born citizens. 78 The last right was the principal right violated by At first, the provision only incorporated against the States those rights that were "sufficiently 'fundamental'" and "essential to the scheme of ordered liberty," but eventually the Court also enforced unenumerated rights against the States via the Due Process Clause. 146 149 Despite his agreement with the plurality that the Second Amendment protects a fundamental right, he lumped the plurality opinion in with Lochner, Roe, and Lawrence to demonstrate the folly of using that method of incorporation, which he considers a "legal fiction" that lacks a guiding principle.
150
Justice Thomas finally had an opportunity to ascertain "the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it."
151
Reasoning that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment would have written it to be understood by the voters, Justice Thomas explained that his real task was finding what "'ordinary citizens'" would have understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean at the time of ratification. 152 First, he pointed out the terms "privileges" and "immunities" had a long tradition, going back centuries in England, as being synonymous with "rights."
153 He pointed out that the public's previous understanding of their privileges and immunities as citizens of the several states provided under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution to further his case-privileges and immunities are only those rights "'which are, in their nature, fundamental.'" 154 Article IV, Section 2 therefore kept States from denying traveling citizens the fundamental rights they guaranteed to their own citizens.
155
But Justice Thomas still faced two huge questions of constitutional interpretation. First, he asked, "[a]re the privileges or immunities of 'citizens of the United States' recognized by § 1 the same as the privileges and immunities of 'citizens in the Several States' to which Article IV, § 2 refers?" 156 Justice Thomas answered that the evidence "overwhelmingly demonstrates" that the privileges and immunities protected by Section 1 included individual enumerated constitutional rights, such as the right to bear arms. Drawing on a variety of sources, Justice Thomas focused primarily on the context in which the thirty-ninth Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because it "illuminates what the public understood the words chosen by the draftsmen to mean."
158 He pointed to a speech by the main author of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative John Bingham, that expressly advocated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment enforced the Bill of Rights against the States.
159
Representative Bingham's speech was published as a pamphlet and distributed across the country. 160 The sponsor of the Amendment in the Senate, Senator Jacob Howard, made a similar argument on the Senate Floor. 161 Senator Howard's speech was published and discussed in newspapers across the country. 162 Justice Thomas concluded that these statements, among others, "point unambiguously toward the conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enforces at least those fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States." The drafters, therefore, intended the Clause to establish a "minimum baseline of federal rights" for all Americans. 166 Finally, Justice Thomas dealt with the fact that his analysis would effectively overturn more than a century of Supreme Court precedent Though Justice Thomas is certainly not the Court's most faithful guardian of stare decisis, he acknowledged its importance and longevity and recognized that his reasoning broke new ground in modern jurisprudence. 168 He did not hesitate, however, to reject both the Slaughter-House definition of privileges or immunities of federal citizenship and the application of Slaughter-House in Cruikshank. 169 In his view, given the historical evidence, privileges or immunities of federal and state citizenship should overlap; therefore, Slaughter-House was incorrect in that regard.
170
Despite the precedent of Slaughter-House and Cruikshank-which he dismissed-Justice Thomas saw the historical evidence in favor of incorporating the Second Amendment against the States as too strong to ignore.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Plurality's Unsatisfying Discussion of Privileges or Immunities
Justice Alito's plurality opinion was extremely disappointing for originalists who hoped to fully revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause, especially given the manner in which the Court did it-devoting only 172 words to the topic. 172 Alan Gura, counsel for petitioners in McDonald, and Ilya Shapiro, Editor-in-Chief of the Cato Institute's Supreme Court Review, described the plurality's opinion as "uncharacteristically curt" and "odd" given the importance of the issue.
173
Although the plurality mentioned the Slaughter-House dissents of Justices Bradley, Field, and Swayne and admitted that "many legal scholars" dispute the Slaughter-House interpretation, 174 Despite acknowledging that the right to bear arms is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" 177 and citing many of the same sources as Justice Thomas about the understanding of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time it was adopted, 178 the plurality refused to discuss or investigate which clause in Section 1 was intended by the authors to be used to apply the Bill of Rights to the States. years of dissenting valiantly while the Court recognized more and more unenumerated rights, Justice Scalia has shifted his focus. Instead of expressing his "misgivings" about substantive due process and fighting the good fight, perhaps he is now using the twilight of his remarkable career on the bench to help shape the future of substantive due process jurisprudence on the Roberts Court, instead of tearing it down.
While the plurality opinion may be considered incorrect by true originalists, it is indeed a practical course of action. In the end, the Second Amendment was still enforced against the States. Justice Scalia even got the petitioners' counsel in McDonald to admit during oral argument that the tests for whether a right is fundamental under substantive due process and the Privileges or Immunities Clause are nearly identical.
216 Sure, Justice Scalia may have doomed the rebirth of the Privileges or Immunities Clause before it ever occurred, but even if he had not acquiesced, it is very unlikely that the "misgivings" he has about substantive due process would have been rectified by reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas's concurrence, while lone and underappreciated by the other eight members of the Court, could serve as the foundation for a future Supreme Court to reconsider the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The "privileges" and "immunities" of federal citizenship, regardless of their scope, have a long history in this country. They were certainly important enough that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment decided to include them in Section 1-directly before the Due Process Clause. 217 Even if the Privileges or Immunities Clause is forever doomed to remain "the darling of the professoriate," 218 the prerogative of defining constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities is still left to the Supreme Court under the Due Process Clause. Because the tests for determining the applicability of rights against the States under the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses are nearly identical, it is likely that originalist members of the Court will still have the framework available to limit the creation of unenumerated rights. Using 
